This paper takes on the apparent paradox of India's combination of durable democracy, capable bureaucracy, but a deficient development trajectory. It begins by outlining the nature of the problem. Then it summarizes and compares some significant approaches to drawing connections from governance institutions to development outcomes. Next, it reviews some of the contributions to understanding India's political economy in the last few decades. Finally, it attempts to draw some lessons from India's experience for the application of different theories of governance and development. The central lesson is that the paradox recedes when attention is paid to the subnational level, where India's states encompass considerable variation in initial societal and economic conditions and in development outcomes.
Introduction
India's combination of durable democracy and low levels of development make it an important case study for the role of the state in development. Evans and Heller (2018) , in surveying the Asian experience and its lessons, label India as a "paradox" (p. 10) for this literature, and the "most analytically challenging" (p. 1) of the Asian states. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) , in their sweeping analysis of the interaction of political and economic institutions in shaping development, have relatively little to say about India, but Subramanian (2013) , in reviewing their work, points out that India (as well as China) is a significant outlier in the cross-country relationship between a democracy index and GDP per capita: it is "too economically underdeveloped, given the quality of its political institutions." Subramanian concludes that the specificities of the history of India (and China) make them unsuited for parsimonious theorizing.
Can one do better?
There is a literature that starts from the specificities of India. Sinha (2016) identifies Frankel (1979) , Herring (1983) , Bardhan (1998 Bardhan ( [1984 ), Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) , and Kohli (1987 Kohli ( , 1990 as early contributors to conceptualizing a political economy of India. Evans and Heller (2018) also remind us of Myrdal's (1968) analysis of India in the context of looking at Asia, and Evans (1995) pays considerable attention to India, although his analysis of South Korea is mostly what receives attention -again because its story seems clearer than India's. This paper seeks to distill and unify some of the vast literature on the state and development with the express purpose of trying to evaluate how well parsimonious theorizing can explain India's experience. Evans and Heller (2018) and many others begin with the "state" and unpack that concept (for example, separating out politicians and bureaucrats, or different layers of government). An alternative perspective makes groups (often left abstract, but commonly defined by class, caste or possibly regional boundaries) the building blocks of coalitions that define particular kinds of social order (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009) . To the extent that a dominant coalition has a monopoly over the "legitimate" use of violence, this is the "state," as conceived by Weber (1991) : "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of Theories of Governance and Development: How Does India's Experience Fit? Nirvikar Singh 2 the use of physical force within a given territory" (p.78). Nevertheless, the different starting points are indicative of different methodological approaches. In the title, we have chosen to use the term more amorphous term, "governance," chiefly to avoid any reifying connotations of the "state."
The next section examines some of the relevant literature on the interaction between political and economic institutions in driving development. The approaches considered are those of the "developmental state" (for example, Evans, 1995) , "access orders" (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009 ), inclusive and extractive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) and "political settlements" (Khan, 2010) .
1 This is not meant to be a comprehensive survey, but rather, a quick overview of the similarities and differences of approach. This seems useful in a situation where the different strands of thought may not fully engage with each other. 2 Section 3 summarizes some of the analyses of India's political economy, including the works called out by Sinha (2016) and listed earlier, but also more recent efforts such as Joshi (2017) , as well as comparative studies such Evans and Heller (2018) , where India is given significant attention. In much of the writing of economists, the focus is on normative economic policy (for example, Panagariya, 2008) , with limited explicit attention to underlying political factors, but even neglect of politics in the analysis is worth pointing out in some cases. Again, we will not attempt to be comprehensive in treating a large literature. Section 4 then tries to offer some evaluation of how to make progress in understanding the "paradox" of India, perhaps to the point of removing the paradox entirely. This section further draws on studies of India, but emphasizes the subnational level much more. Rao and Singh (2005) was a relatively early attempt at this approach, but much has happened in India since then, and a large literature on decentralization efforts in India has emerged. Section 5 offers a summary conclusion for this paper.
1 The references given in each case are synthetic works of these authors, and each builds on earlier work of their own and others. 2 In particular, Evans and Heller (2018) reference none of the other approaches, and other authors mention alternatives mostly in passing.
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Theories of Governance and Development
The explicit concept of a "developmental state" is often traced to the analysis of Japan's postWorld War II economic success (Johnson, 1982) , with further refinements based on other East
Asian experience (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990) . The modern generalization and conceptualization of this approach can be attributed to Evans (1995) , with his treatment of South Korea, Brazil and India, and the introduction of the notion of "embedded autonomy." This modifies the Weberian idea of a capable, autonomous bureaucracy as the key implementer of state development policies, to emphasize that this group must also be "embedded" in society in ways that enhance information flows and "negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies" (Evans, 1995, p. 12) . The intellectual influence of Weber also reminds us that there has been a much older tradition of recognizing the role of the state in development, in European cases such as France (for example, Loriaux, 1999) and Germany (Boldrin et al., 2012) , as well as the earlier history of Japan (Horie, 1937) .
The key role of autonomy in this narrative is familiar, that of avoiding political capture by the private industrial elites who were needed for implementing crucial aspects of economic development. Evans and Heller (2018) , in their summary, emphasize the other preconditions for a developmental state, namely, a balance of power that included weak civil society, and landed elites that had been wiped out by war or revolution. The final piece of the story is the perception of national elites that development was necessary for national survival amid geopolitical threats.
The balance of power and perceptions of survival threats were differentiators from other countries with bureaucracies that appeared to satisfy the condition of embedded autonomy, such as the Philippines (Kang, 2002; You, 2005) .
One might even veer toward the view that what constitutes effective "embedded autonomy" depends on other, contextual and historical elements, and, furthermore, that the concept itself needs broadening (Evans, 2010; Routley, 2012) , to the point where it cannot be a fundamental building block in understanding the developmental state. Indeed, the developmental role of the state may be too complex to be amenable to parsimonious answers (Bardhan, 2016) . (Boldrin et al., 2012) . So it may be that the framework of inclusive and extractive institutions, while identifying and labeling an interaction between politics and economics that is needed for development (the creation and distribution of economic rents 3 ), may leave out important factors, or not be analytically sharp enough. While Acemoglu and
Robinson bring more focus on the "primitives" of the distribution of power, they may not sufficiently address the specifics of institutions such as the bureaucracy, and may overemphasize the priority of inclusive political institutions over economic institutions -the reverse causality from economic development to political inclusiveness may not be acknowledged enough.
North , violence control and institution-building, and the mature LAO does better still, but personalization and exclusion still matter. The OAO represents a difference in kind from LAOs, compared to the differences in degree among different gradations of LAOs.
The NWW focus is on coalition formation among groups in society, and the impacts of the distribution of power for the type of order that emerges and evolves. In that sense, it is related to Acemoglu and Robinson's conceptualization, but it also seems to have more commonalities with ideas of "weak" and "strong" states, in the literature on the state and development, or the interpretation of that literature in terms of institutional economics concepts such as credible commitment (Bardhan, 2016) . Arguably, NWW also have a sharper notion of political competition, especially in leadership contests, than the inclusive political institutions of Acemoglu and Robinson (Kotwal and Roy Chaudhuri, 2015) . Both NWW and Acemoglu and
Robinson have, in the background, models of market competition based on dispersed and assured property rights, something that is less firmly in the state and development writings of noneconomists. On the other hand, the NWW emphasis on control of violence (Gray, 2015) seems to limit their view of wasteful (Directly Unproductive Profit Seeking, or DUP - Bhagwati, 1982) rent-seeking, which could involve other socially costly behaviors besides violence. Gray also critiques the narrow perspective on human behavior associated with neoclassical economics, just when economics is incorporating behavioral and evolutionary considerations in models of social order and dynamics. 5 She also highlights the underlying transaction cost perspective that has shaped the NWW approach and which is a hallmark of the new institutional economics.
6
A final related approach to be described here is the "political settlements" concept of Khan (1995 Khan ( , 2010 . Khan sees this as related to, but more precisely defined than, the concept of a "social order." Specifically, his definition is (Khan, 2010, p. 4) , "A political settlement is a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability." Noting the difficulty of defining power in any kind of general manner, Khan (2010, p. 6) Acemoglu et al. (2011) , that provide parts of an overall understanding of the interaction between political and economic institutions.
India's Political Economy
In this section we provide a quick tour of some of the salient analyses of India's political economy, trying to relate them to the general theories presented in Section 2. Evans and Heller (2018) highlight several important themes with respect to Indian experience in Myrdal's (1968) sprawling work: the importance of human capital and India's failure to invest in it sufficiently, the problem of social inequality and lack of rural infrastructure, inadequate social protections, and ultimately a democratic apparatus with more form than substance -a "soft" state. There are many areas where Myrdal's analysis was less accurate, particularly with respect to other parts of Asia, but this distillation of his diagnosis of India's challenges seems to have held up well 50 years later.
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Frankel (1979) offered a pessimistic view of Indian politics, as unable to accommodate the social change needed for significant economic development. Her earlier work on the Green Revolution had turned out to be prescient in predicting the negative consequences of increased inequality, as can be seen in contemporary Punjab (Singh, 2016 ). An updated version of her more general analysis, bringing it up to 2004, reprised her earlier themes, but ultimately can be seen as description in search of a theoretical framework.
To varying degrees, Herring (1983) , Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) and Kohli (1987) Bardhan (1998 Bardhan ( [1984 ) and Kohli (1990) reduced to collections of loyalists with no internal organization to speak of) combined with weak leaders, along with class conflict and a proliferation of demand groups. In retrospect, governance in India has proved more resilient, surviving many minority governments, managing a slow but rational process of economic policy reform, and achieving some decentralization without jeopardizing national unity or stability.
9
Bardhan updated his original 1984 analysis in 1998, after India had embarked on a process of "economic reform," which has been marked by loosening of government control of the domestic economy, particularly industry, and opening up to international trade. This has also been seen as a "retreat" of the state, but that perspective probably needs qualification. Bardhan in 1998 noted that subsidies for various interest groups remained mostly in place, and did not see a major shift in the political equilibrium he had described 15 years earlier. While he was cautious about the continued progress of market-oriented reforms, he noted changes in the dominant coalition (more diversity, greater fluidity) and in bureaucratic attitudes (some acceptance that the state had overextended itself, beyond its capacity).He also suggested a connection between the two:
traditional elites pushed out of government because of broader reservations would favor policy changes that would give them more opportunities in the private sector.
10
The thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Bardhan's book provided a further opportunity for examination of changes in India's political economy. Bardhan (2015) emphasizes the difficulties of collective action in the face of social heterogeneity and inequality, especially for long-term public investment. The apparent lack of state capacity is then potentially traceable to the systemic problems of inequality, rather than a shortage of expertise. He also highlights the increasing mismatch between aspirations and opportunities, especially for young people in India, and perceptions of illegitimacy of capitalism when corruption and unproductive rent-seeking flourish at the expense of more inclusive economic growth. The cost of competing in elections has also increased, attenuating the force of political competition. Again referring back to the 9 Singh (2018) offers an institutional analysis of the role of India's federal structures and institutions in holding India together. 10 Another possibility is that emigration among elites provided a way out in the face of broader caste-based reservations in the public sector. Furthermore, this has also created a positive feedback loop for economic reform. India's size and the heterogeneity of its society. In this respect, "embedded autonomy" sits uneasily as an explanator of the Indian experience, a judgement reinforced by an expansion of the meaning of the term in the context of understanding the case of Kerala (p. 237): "it was in a position to put the relatively well developed bureaucratic autonomy that characterized the Indian system as a whole together with its own brand of embeddedness to produce a … an idiosyncratic version of "embedded autonomy," extremely well suited to accomplishing a transformative project aimed at increased levels of welfare." We return to the "idiosyncratic" case of Kerala in Section 4, along with the more general re-evaluation by Evans and Heller (2018) .
Theories of Governance
As noted in the introduction, most of the debate among economists with respect to India's development trajectory has been about technical issues of policy reform, along with the goals of policy -what constitutes development? Bhagwati and Panagariya (2013) Finally, one of the most recent volumes on Indian economic reform (Joshi, 2017) includes an explicit analysis of India's political economy during this time. Joshi emphasizes increased political and economic fragmentation, greater salience of identity politics, and increased corruption. His view of state competence and accountability is quite negative, more so, at first sight, than the perspective on the bureaucracy offered by analysts such as Evans and Kohli. To some extent, this reflects viewing the state more broadly than just the elite bureaucracy, and when that is recognized, there is probably almost unanimity on the weakness of the state below the top rungs. Corruption and crony capitalism are also reflected in a decay in bureaucratic autonomy, and even in the institutional decay of political parties. This suggests a state moving backward along any normative ordering, in any of the conceptualizations of that ordering discussed in Section 2. This is another issue to be examined in the next section.
Governance Theories for India
India's development trajectory seems to present a challenge for theories that link the structure of governance to development performance, so much so that Evans and Heller (2018) pose the issue as a paradox. Their own resolution of the puzzle has several components. First, they acknowledge the point made at the end of the last section, one that has been made by many, and one which does not accord with an emphasis on the embedded autonomy of elite bureaucrats:
India's state capacity tapers off dramatically outside a narrow, centralized elite. Second, they highlight another common observation, that India failed to be sufficiently inclusive in its initial development strategy, whether it was effective broad-based investments in health and education, failure to reallocate productive assets such as land, or fostering access to financial capital for those entrepreneurs who could generate jobs for the masses. Third, they argue that India's size and heterogeneity make it difficult to achieve the right kind of embedded autonomy -there are too many different kinds of interests to be balanced. This is, of course, reminiscent of Bardhan's political economy analysis. Fourth, they draw attention to the problems of governance at the subnational level, particularly the local level, where effective democracy was absent for decades, and still lacks adequate funding, even after the creation of formal democratic structures through constitutional amendments.
We might abstract from these four components, and describe the situation as one of vertical as well as horizontal dispersion in characteristics and initial conditions. Furthermore, the emphasis on maintaining national political unity or integrity can be seen as resulting in sacrificing the building up of capabilities outside existing centers of power. In this narrative, India's elites made a tradeoff between development and stability, and, like any elite, erred on the side of choices that defended the status quo. One can also include non-instrumental factors, such as hubris and selfesteem: the derision accorded to "uncultured" nouveau riche small-town entrepreneurs by the successors to the colonial elite suggests this (Mishra, 1995) .
Putting aside cultural factors, which can be surprisingly amenable to adjustment if economic incentives change, we would argue that concepts such as the "state" and "embedded autonomy"
may not be the right starting point for a theory of governance that can have explanatory power for the Indian experience. The same applies, to some extent, to the "inclusive-extractive" dichotomy of Acemoglu and Robinson, which may be also be too hard to pin down in its specifics for a theory that works for India (aside from other sources of critique of their analytical analysis. Like Evans and Heller (2018) and other analysts of India's governance, they note the diversity of outcomes at the local level, that have resulted from decentralization. 13 This diversity can be seen as a function of heterogeneous initial conditions: for example, the political ideology of leftist parties in power in Kerala and West Bengal changed the distribution of local power prior to national decentralization legislation. In Kerala in particular, human capital in the form of health and education was more evenly distributed than anywhere else in India.
Mangla (2015) provides another subnational example, but focusing at the level of state bureaucracies rather than elected local governments (which in fact lack their own bureaucracies for policy design and implementation). He compares two states, Himachal Pradesh (HP) and
Uttarakhand, which are similar in terms of size, geography and societal composition. He makes the case that HP has done better in delivering public education to its population because of a more effective bureaucracy, but that this effectiveness has not been determined by formal, Weberian characteristics, but instead by informal norms and organizational culture. In particular, he views HP as illustrating the positive impacts of deliberative governance, which allowed for a certain level of collective wisdom to emerge. The difference in Uttarakhand was a more legalistic approach, which might be considered more typical of Indian bureaucracy, and indeed, the state was only split off from the behemoth of Uttar Pradesh (with a population comparable to Brazil's) only relative recently. Some of Mangla's observations and analysis are reminiscent of the more well-known case of Kerala, which has been described by Evans (1995) as well as Evans and Heller (2018) . The general lesson may be that it is not helpful to examine India in the aggregate, in trying to establish the line from governance institutions to development performance: there is too much local and regional variation. In addition, the evolution of local or regional norms may be an understandable and predictable phenomenon, as analyzed in Ostrom (1990) .
Another illustration of this point is the work of Khan (2010) , echoed in Roy (2013). Khan's framing is in terms of clientelist political settlements, whereas Roy uses the concept of LAOs.
The analysis compares the experience of Maharashtra and West Bengal as examples of evolving LAOs. The Maharashtra case was particularly interesting, because it described how control of growing and refining sugar by the political elite in that state allowed them to provide space for industrialists to invest and prosper, at least relatively to the rest of the country. West Bengal, on the other hand, saw a different type of LAO, based on control of agriculture and stifling of industry. Khan, in particular, describes the details of political coalitions, rent-seeking, and the influence and interplay of caste and class in two states that were perhaps not dissimilar when India became independent, but diverged dramatically over the decades following. The complexity of comparing even these two subnational cases is illustrated by the differing geographies: in particular, West Bengal was separated from much of its former rural heartland due to Partition.
Sinha (2005) is also an important example of comparison across states. She chooses Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, and characterizes her framework as that of treating these cases as multilevel developmental states. It is difficult to distill the comparisons she makes as easily as the Maharashtra-West Bengal comparison in the last paragraph, but clearly the variations in social composition, and the distributions of political and economic power were important in driving the different development trajectories of the three states. Tamil Nadu's proximity to the software hub of Bangalore, even though it is in a neighboring state, also mattered.
A comparison that has not been systematically explored, but would also be useful, is that of the neighboring states of Punjab and Haryana, which were part of the same state until 1966, during the early part of the Green Revolution. Geography and social composition have mattered here as well, with Haryana having the good fortune to see the development of Gurgaon as an outsourcing hub, and to be spared the consequences of the violent religio-political conflict that has had continuing negative effects on Punjab's development. The emergence of a non-agricultural capitalist class in Haryana changed the room for how rents were created and captured in ways reminiscent of Maharashtra, while Punjab stagnated and fell prey to systemic, encompassing corruption without any meaningful political competition as a check (Singh, 2016) . access order or political settlements framework is the best for considering these varied cases, or the developmental state or inclusive-extractive institutions models can do the job, is a question that can be resolved only by attempted application. The point to be made to close this section is that India's case is not paradoxical or contradictory -it is simply being tackled at the wrong level of aggregation for many, if not most, parts of the answer.
Conclusions
In this paper we have taken on the apparent paradox of India's failure to fit encompassing theories of the relationship between governance institutions and development outcomes. One part of the answer we provide is that beginning with the concept of the state, and its developmental or non-developmental characteristics may not be the ideal starting point. The theory of inclusive vs.
extractive political and economic institutions may also not provide enough analytical sharpness for the case of India. Instead, theories (such as those based on different kinds of access orders or political settlements) that begin with societal groups and organizations (formal and informal) may be the appropriate primitives, allowing a better focus on the distribution of power that ultimately shapes outcomes. This ranking of theoretical approaches can still be debated. It must also be acknowledged that all four theoretical approaches discussed here do acknowledge the importance of underlying group formations and the inequalities inherent in them, but perhaps they do not bring these initial conditions into sharp enough focus, nor trace the links from inequality to institutional characteristics precisely enough.
14 However, the deeper and more practical message of this paper is that the apparent contradictions or predictive failures of governance theories in the Indian context arise from a failure to consider India's subnational constituent units comparatively and systematically. We have provided some
illustrative examples of what can be possible in such comparisons, and building up from a fuller set of these cases may be the way to understand how theories of governance institutions perform in explain India's development outcomes. A further complication, of course, is that India's states are not sovereign entities, but are influenced by, and influence the workings of the national government. This federal aspect of governance in India needs to be incorporated as well (Rao and Singh, 2005; Singh, 2007) . 15 We recognize that no theory will explain everything, nor should it. Yet it is useful to close by acknowledging that this paper has not considered all the historical and institutional factors that may be important in understanding the Indian experience, nor has it considered all the existing theories and their variations. Nevertheless, we hope it makes a contribution to the larger debates about an important topic, and stimulates further research along these lines.
15 For example, the models referenced in the previous footnote could be extended to allow for the interaction of different tiers of government, if they are to be useful in understanding the Indian development experience.
